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ASBESTOS AND THE DALKON SHIELD:
CORPORATE AMERICA ON TRIAL
Joseph A. Page*
AT ANY COST: CORPORATE GREED, WOMEN, AND THE DALKON
SHIELD. By Morton Mintz. New York: Pantheon Books. 1985. Pp.
xvii, 308. $17.95.
OUTRAGEOUS MISCONDUCT: THE AsBESTOS INDUSTRY ON TRIAL.
By Paul Brodeur. New York: Pantheon Books. 1985. Pp. viii, 374.
$19.95.
Asbestos and the Dalkon Shield intrauterine device share a
number of unhappy distinctions. Both products have exacted a terrible human toll. 1 Damage suits seeking recovery for harm linked to
both have put considerable strain on the judicial system. 2 Corporate
decisions made in the course of marketing both have been deemed reprehensible. 3 Manufacturers of both have sought refuge in bank-

* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. B.A. 1955, LL.B. 1958, LL.M.
1964, Harvard University. - Ed. The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Christine
A. Markman and Doriane Lambelet, Class of 1988, Georgetown University Law Center.
1. [W]e estimate that 8,800 asbestos-related cancer deaths are occurring this year. The
toll will rise to about 10,000 annually by the year 2000, and will continue until the year
2030, all from exposures that took place prior to 1980. Overall, it is estimated that 350,000
deaths will occur before the toll from these exposures is ended unless some intervention is
developed to prevent the inevitable mortality.
. . . One can estimate, and here the estimates are much more uncertain, that there will be
200,000 or 300,000 individuals, perhaps even more that will suffer significant impairment or
disability from the consequences of asbestos exposure.

Investigation as to Whether or Not There is a National Asbestos Crisis; and if so, What Should Be
Done About It: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate Comm. on Labor and
Human Resources. 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1984) (statement of William J. Nicholson, Ph.D.,

Environmental Sciences Laboratory, Mount Sinai School of Medicine, City University of New
York). A more conservative projection foresees from 74,000 to 265,000 deaths over the next
thirty years. J. KAKALJK, P. EBENER, w. FELSTINER & M. SHANLEY, Cosrs OP AsBESTOS
LmGATION 3 (Rand Institute of Civil Justice Pub. No. R-3042-ICJ, 1983).
In At Any Cost, Mintz estimates that tens of thousands of women have been seriously injured
by the Dalkon Shield: 66,000 women who conceived while wearing the Shield miscarried, while
248 endured septic spontaneous abortions, of which 15 were fatal. Pp. 34. No one knows the
extent of the damage inflicted by the 800,000 to one million Shields distributed and implanted
abroad. P. 4.
2. See generally Bruck, The Armies ofAsbestos, AM. LAW., Nov. 1979, at 19; Chen, Asbestos
Litigation is a Growth Industry, ATLANTIC, July 1984, at 24; Wellington, Asbestos: The Private
Management of a Public Problem, 33 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 375 (1984-1985); Masters, Asbestos
Liability Suits Strain Manufacturers, Court System, Legal Times, Mar. 30, 1981, at 1, col. 2.
On the Dalkon Shield, see Bamford, Dalkon Shield Starts Losing in Court, AM. LAW., July
1980, at 31; Courie, The A.H. Robins Saga, A.B.A. J., July 1, 1986, at 56; Middleton, Robins
Mounts Drive to Settle Dalkon Suits, Natl. L.J., Dec. 24, 1984, at 1, col. 3.
3. See, e.g., Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 781 F.2d 394 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 106
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ruptcy. 4 And both have provided the grist for hard-hitting books by
veteran investigative journalists.
Paul Brodeur's Outrageous Misconduct: The Asbestos Industry on
Trial returns a harsh verdict against the Manville Corporation and
others directly and indirectly involved in the production of what was
once called the "magic mineral."5 Morton Mintz makes a similar
finding with respect to the A.H. Robins Company in At Any Cost:
Corporate Greed, Women, and the Dalkon Shield. 6
Both men are thoroughly familiar with their subjects. Brodeur, a
staff writer for The New Yorker, has published several books on asbestos. 7 As an investigative reporter for The Washington Post, Mintz has
long prowled the pharmaceutical industry beat. 8
This review will first briefly evaluate the books on their own terms
and then comment upon their contributions to an understanding of
tort law and the torts process. Their relevance to the current "liability
crisis" will receive special attention.
I

Effective muckraking dramatizes the existence of a serious social
problem and casts light upon those responsible for causing it. The
muckraker characteristically tends to be compassionate, identifying
with the friendless and voiceless victims of society's indifference or
worse. 9 Thus, by definition this genre of writing is tendentious. But if
factually honest, skil1fully crafted, and as persuasive as fervent in its
denunciations of malfeasance and nonfeasance, it serves a noble purpose in bringing to the public agenda injustices which cry out for
redress.
Brodeur and Mintz are contemporary practitioners of the muckraker's art. 10 Although the perils of asbestos and the Dalkon Shield
S. Ct. 3339 (1986) Gury had adequate basis for concluding that defendant demonstrated gross
disregard for safety of shipyard worker); Palmer v. A.H. Robins Co., 684 P.2d 187 (Colo. 1984)
Gury could find beyond reasonable doubt that defendant's conduct evidenced wanton and reckless disregard for plaintiff's rights).
4. On the asbestos bankruptcy, see Special Project, An Analysis of the Legal, Social, and
Political Issues Raised by Asbestos Litigation, 36 VAND. L. R.Ev. 573, 814-30 (1983) [hereinafter
Special Project]. Mintz discusses the Robins bankruptcy in At Any Cost at pp. 245-46.
5. See Brodeur, The Magic Mineral, NEW YORKER, Oct. 12, 1968, at 117.
6. For another recent book covering much of the same ground, see S. PERRY & J. DAWSON,
NIGHTMARE: WOMEN AND THE DALKON SHIELD (1985).
7. See P. BRODEUR, AsBESTOS AND ENZYMES (1972); P. BRODEUR, EXPENDABLE AMERICANS (1974). Brodeur has also written several novels, the most noteworthy of which, The Stunt
Man, was made into a memorable motion picture starring Peter O'Toole.
8. See M. MINTZ, THE THERAPEUTIC NIGHTMARE (1965) (revised and republished as BY
PRESCRIPTION ONLY (1967)); M. MINTZ, "THE PILL": AN ALARMING REPORT (1969).
9. See Swado3, Introduction to YEARS OF CoNSCIENCE: THE MUCKRAKERS at 9, 9-10 (H.
Swados ed. 1962).
10. See L. DOWNIE, THE NEW MUCKRAKERS 225, 240 (1976).
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have generated ample publicity in recent years, 11 information suggesting how these products were able to cause such havoc has emerged
gradually over a period of time. Brodeur and Mintz piece this data
together and then draw harsh conclusions from it.
Outrageous Misconduct takes as its subject a public health hazard
of mind-boggling proportions. 12 The inhalation of dust from raw asbestos and products containing the substance (most notably textiles
and insulation materials) can cause a serious and unique lung disease
called asbestosis as well as cancers of the lung and chest cavity. It was
not until Dr. Irving J. Selikoff released the results of his studies of the
incidence of cancer among asbestos insulation workers in 1964 (p. 31)
that the potential reach of the asbestos tragedy first came to public
light. Brodeur's principal thesis is that the Manville Corporation, 13
the world's largest producer of asbestos, and other asbestos marketers
had reason to know long before 1964 that their products posed serious
risks to those exposed to them, yet engaged in a massive cover-up
which kept potential victims behind a veil of ignorance. He also argues vigorously against any curtailment of the rights of individuals
harmed by asbestos to recover full tort damages, and hence opposes
the Manville bankruptcy, proposals for no-fault compensation
schemes, and federal product-liability legislation favoring corporate
interests.
At Any Cost traces the history of a contraceptive device which subjected users to the risk of extensive harm to their reproductive systems
as well as spontaneous abortions, and is associated with serious birth
defects in children born to mothers who conceived while wearing it.
Mintz bases his case study of corporate wrongdoing upon the actions
of the A.H. Robins Company in purchasing the Dalkon Shield from a
small firm which had developed it under dubious circumstances, 14 and
then aggressively marketing it without testing for safety or efficacy; 1s
11. On asbestos, see, e.g., s. EPSTEIN, THE POLITICS OF CANCER, 83-93 (1978); J. PAGE &
M. O'BRIEN, BITrER WAGES, 20-24 (1972); J. STELLMAN & S. DAUM, WORK IS DANGEROUS
TO YOUR HEALTH, 171-79 (1973).
On the Dalkon Shield, see Hearings on Regulation of Medical Devices (Intrauterine Contra·

ceptive Devices) Before the Intergovernmental Relations Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Gov·
emment Operations, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) [hereinafter IUD Hearings]; Doubts About IUDs,
nME, July 15, 1974, at 81; Dowie & Johnston, Case of Corporate Ma/practice, MOTHER JONES,
Nov. 1976, at 36; see also Ehrenreich, Dowie & Minkin, The Charge: Genocide, MOTHER JONES,
Nov. 1979, at 26, 28-30 (export of Dalkon Shields).
12. See note 1 supra.
13. In 1901 the Manville Covering Company merged with the H.W. Johns Manufacturing
Company to become the H.W. Johns-Manville Company. P. 13. The company subsequently
changed its name to the Manville Corporation. P. 249.
14. The physician who first touted the Shield in the medical literature did not disclose to
readers that he was part owner of the corporation which held the rights to distribute the device.
P. 31. Moreover, the substantive claims made by this physician with respect to the Shield were
dubious. Pp. 31-37.
15. At that time the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act did not require approval by the Food
and Drug Administration (FDA) before a medical device could be marketed; the FDA could
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in struggling to conceal or downplay reports of adverse reactions as
they began to surface; in using questionable tactics in defending product liability suits brought by women injured by the Shield; 16 and in
delaying a recall of the product for ten years.
·
Both books go beyond finger-pointing. Mintz sees the Dalkon
Shield disaster as illustrative of the larger problem of corporate criminality. Deploring the double standard which permits large companies
to escape responsibility for conduct which would subject individuals to
severe criminal sanctions, he suggests strengthening the criminal law
as a deterrent to behavior such as Robins'. Mintz cites as a positive
development the conviction of three corporate executives for permitting non-English-speaking employees to work with cyanide to recover
silver from used X-ray film without warning them of the lethal nature
of the substance (pp. 253-54).
Brodeur, like Mintz, mentions the cyanide prosecution in his conclusion (p. 349). Yet he discounts its importance, since he sees the
epidemic of asbestos-related disease as symptomatic of the destructive
tendencies of the private enterprise system. Ironically, he goes on to
argue that the best defense against the type of misconduct which produced the disaster is the private tort suit, which depends upon investments of time, money, and talent by entrepreneur-lawyers.17
Neither author hides his indignation. Mintz exercises more restraint, although the insensitivity of Robins officials to the suffering of
Dalkon Shield victims severely tests him. He is able to express strong
feelings vicariously by making extensive use of the impassioned reprimand of three executive officers of Robins delivered in open court by
Chief Judge Miles W. Lord of the United States District Court for
initiate enforcement action against a device only if it could be established that the device was
adulterated or misbranded. 21 U.S.C. §§ 33l(a)-(c), 351, 352 (1970). See generally Davidson,
Preventative ''Medicine" for Medical Devices: Is Further Regulation Required?, 55 MARQ. L.
REV. 405 (1972).
In 1976 Congress enacted medical device amendments which require premarket approval for
devices such as the Dalkon Shield. Pub. L. No. 94-295, 90 Stat. 539 (codified at 21 U.S.C.
§§ 360-360K (1976)). Both the Senate and House Committee Reports specifically mentioned the
Shield as a product which had caused harm that could have been prevented if the new law had
been in effect when it was first marketed. See S. REP. No. 33, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1975);
H.R. REP. No. 853, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1976).
16. Mintz scores Robins for making unreasonable and irrelevant inquiries into the sex: lives of
plaintiffs, ostensibly to determine whether unhygienic habits might have caused their diseases,
but in reality to intimidate women and discourage them from suing the company. Pp. 194-96.
One of the judges before whom Dalkon Shield cases were tried voiced a similar complaint about
Robins' conduct. P. 8.
Pelvic inflammatory disease, however, may result from causes other than intrauterine devices,
and therefore the causation issue has presented some plaintiffs with considerable difficulty. See
generally Note, Beyond the Dalkon Shield: Proving Causation Against IUD Manufacturers for
PID Related Injury, 13 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 639 (1983). As of the end of 1984, Robins
had won about half the cases which had gone to trial. See Middleton, supra note 2, at 9, col. 1.
17. On entrepreneur-lawyers generally, see S. SPEISER, LAWSUIT (1980).
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Minnesota. 18
Brodeur, on the other hand, lashes out sharply and often at those
whom he views as contributing to the plight of asbestos victims. Doctors who failed to alert the public to the perils of asbestos "were acting
in the time-honored tradition of the American medical profession,
whose members, by and large, continue to avoid speaking out on important matters of occupational and environmental health" (p. 180).
Senator Gary Hart receives the back of Brodeur's hand repeatedly (to
the point of redundance) for introducing a "bailout" bill written in
consultation with Manville lobbyists and setting up a compensation
system which would cut off Manville's tort liability (pp. 192, 254, 260,
318). Occasionally Brodeur's rhetoric can be excessive, as when he
calls legislative efforts to emasculate the common law of products liability "a perverse and stupid exercise in participatory democracy" (p.
354).
Mintz' task is simpler than Brodeur's, in that his subject is more
manageable. He is dealing with one corporation, one product, a more
limited group of victims and a relatively brief time frame. Thus, he is
able to tell his story chronologically, beginning with the invention of
the Dalkon Shield. This makes At Any Cost easy to grasp for readers
unfamiliar with the topic.
On the other hand, Outrageous Misconduct rests upon a much
more complicated factual predicate. Asbestos has been used for more
than 4500 years. 19 The Greeks and Romans first observed its harmful
effects (p. 10). It is a component of a wide range of products. Its
victims - mainly workers - have come from varied occupations
which subjected them to different levels of exposures. Cigarette smok18. Peter Huber calls Judge Lord's statement an "intemperate charge ••• badly out of touch
with business reality." He goes on to state that "[i]f corporate officials and lawyers at Robbins
[sic] had anticipated even a single death or serious injury from sales of the Shield it seems entirely
obvious that the Company would never have dreamt of marketing the product." Huber, Safety
and the Second Best: The Hazards ofPublic Risk Management in the Courts, 85 COLUM. L. REV.
277, 319 n.149 (1985). This criticism seems badly out of touch with Judge Lord's actual charge,
which focused almost exclusively upon Robins' conduct after the device was marketed. The
statement is reprinted in its entirety in At Any Cost at pp. 264-69.
Judge Lord attached the text of his reprimand to a notation to the parties' settlement agreement in the case before him. Robins and the three executive officers appealed to the Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit to strike the reprimand from the record. The Eighth Circuit
found the reprimand improper and ordered it stricken. Gardiner v. A.H. Robins Co., 747 F.2d
1180 (8th Cir. 1984). Robins and the executives also filed misconduct charges against Judge
Lord before the Judicial Council of the Eighth Circuit. They were dismissed on the ground that
the ruling of the court in Gardiner had granted appropriate relief. Pp. 236-37. Lord estimated
that he owed between $70,000 and $100,000 for attorneys' fees and expenses incurred in his
defense.
The court's expungement of Lord's denunciation has not succeeded in suppressing it. In
addition to its reprinting in At Any Cost, it has also been republished, with annotations, in 9
HAMLINE L. REV. 7 (1986) (issue dedicated to Judge Lord). See also s. ENGELMAYER & R.
WAGMAN, LoRD'S JUSTICE (1985).
19. See G. PETERS & B. PETERS, SoURCEBOOK ON AsBESTOS DISEASES: MEDICAL, LEGAL,
AND ENGINEERING AsPECTS Al (1980).
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ing greatly increases the risk that an asbestos worker will develop lung
cancer. Moreover, the ranks of those whose decisions or inaction affected the degree of risk posed by asbestos products include not only
officials of companies which sold asbestos products, but also insurers,
physicians, attorneys, labor leaders, and government bureaucrats.
In substantiating his cover-up indictment, Brodeur opts to relate in
chronological order not the emergence of facts from which Manville
and others realized or had reason to realize the degree of risk posed by
their products, but rather the product-liability suits which brought to
the surface information with respect to what corporate officials knew
and when they knew it. He strives for drama by treating the case
against the industry like a detective story. Incriminating evidence
gradually unfolds and ensnares Brodeur's targets.
But the complexity of the asbestos tragedy makes it difficult for the
lay reader to piece everything together and absorb it coherently. For
example, the narrative flow does not always differentiate clearly
among the various kinds of employees exposed to asbestos dust miners, textile workers, insulation workers - at various levels of exposure, and between lung cancer and other kinds of pulmonary disease
caused by asbestos dust. Brodeur does quote extensively from the
closing argument of plaintiff's attorney Scott Baldwin in Jackson v.
Johns-Manville Sales Corp. (p. 242), an excellent piece of advocacy
making the case for punitive damages against Manville and a second
supplier on behalf of a sheet-metal worker who had been exposed to
insulation materials in the shipyard where he was employed. 20 But the
author should have undertaken to deliver his own comprehensive, systematic, straight-for-the-jugular summation distilling his entire case
against the asbestos industry. His failure to do so reduces the book's
persuasiveness.
II

Although the general public may find Outrageous Misconduct
somewhat difficult to digest, Brodeur's detailed descriptions of asbestos product-liability cases and his spirited defense of the tort system
should interest and challenge readers familiar with tort law. 21 There is
much of value and much with which to take issue in the book.
20. The Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded a judgment for the plaintiff in Jackson. 727
F.2d 506 (5th Cir. 1984). On rehearing en bane, the court reinstated a portion of the panel
opinion and certified questions oflaw to the Mississippi Supreme Court. 750 F.2d 1314 (5th Cir.
1985). The Mississippi Supreme Court declined certification. 469 So. 2d 99 (Miss. 1985). The
court en bane then affirmed the judgment for plaintiff. 781 F.2d 394 (5th Cir. 1986). The
Supreme Court denied defendant's petition for a writ of certiorari. 106 S. Ct. 3339 (1986).
21. The book has evoked polar reactions. Compare Rosenberg, The Dusting of America: A
Story ofAsbestos - Carnage, Cover Up, and Litigation (Book Review), 99 HARV. L. REv. 1693
(1986) (favorable review of Outrageous Misconduct), with Huber, The Risk Race (Book Review),
THE NEW REPUBLIC, Feb. 3, 1986, at 39 (unfavorable review).
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His opening salvo is the story of Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Products
Corp., 22 in which an insulation worker won a jury verdict against several asbestos suppliers and the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit affirmed. As Brodeur notes, this was "the first case in
the nation to test the applicability of section 402A [of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts] to asbestos-insulation materials,"23 although it did
not produce the first decision on that point. 24 The Borel decision
opened the way for an onslaught of product-liability litigation against
the asbestos industry.
The hero of Brodeur's account of Borel is Ward Stephenson, the
plaintiff's attorney, to whom he dedicates the book, and who died
from cancer just before the Fifth Circuit handed. down its decision.
Stephenson was an East Texas trial lawyer who specialized in representing workers' compensation claimants injured in jobsite accidents.
In 1961 he handled his fiist occupational disease claim, on behalf of a
forty-year-old insulation worker who had developed a serious lung
problem after two decades of exposure to asbestos materials. Under
the Texas Workmen's Compensation Law, the maximum recovery for
permanent total disability at that time was $14,035. Stephenson was
unable to recover even that pittance for his client. He felt compelled
to settle the case for only $7500 because of conflicts in the diagnosis of
his client's illness by the physicians retained by the various parties to
the proceeding. He then hit upon the idea of bringing a tort action
against the manufacturers of the insulation materials with which the
claimant had worked.
The discrepancy between the statutory amount recoverable under
workers' compensation and the full tort damages which might be recovered for the total (and agonizing) disablement of a forty-year-old
employee explains the strategic decision made by Stephenson as well
as by other attorneys representing asbestos victims and facing similar
limitations upon awards against employers.25 Brodeur digresses to ex22. 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974).
23. P. 41. Section 402A imposes strict tort liability upon sellers for harm caused by products
"in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS§ 402A (1965).
24. In Bassham v. Owens-Coming Fiber Glass Corp., 327 F. Supp. 1007, 1009 (D.N.M.
1971), the court stated in dictum that the "physical harm" for which recovery is allowed under
§ 402A does not include occupational disease. The only support which the court proffered for
this conclusion was drawn by analogy from a decision of the New Mexico Supreme Court which
held that occupational disease was not an "injury by accident" and hence was not covered by the
state's workers' compensation law. See Aranbula v. Banner Mining Co., 49 N.M. 253, 161 P.2d
867 (1945). However, there is no indication from the text of§ 402A or the comments to it that
the drafters intended to incorporate judicial interpretations of statutory language totally unrelated to products liability.
25. One academic commentator has averred that plaintiffs suffering from occupational diseases have resorted to common-law suits rather than to workers' compensation because the latter
is "terra incognita to the ordinary personal injury lawyer" and "tort lawyers simply do not know
•.. the compensation system." Epstein, Manville: The Bankruptcy of Product Liability Law,
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plain the origin of workers' compensation coverage of occupational
illnesses, which were not included in the original bargain whereby
workers gave up their common-law remedy for full fault-based damages in return for limited benefits for disability caused by work-connected injuries. 26 The proliferation of negligence claims on behalf of
workers who had contracted silicosis during the early 1930s prompted
the industry to lobby for the extension of workers' compensation to
job-related diseases (p. 18). These amendments provided coverage
that was limited as well as incomplete (pp. 22-23) and benefits so low
that they neither compensated workers for more than a fraction of
their actual loss27 nor provided any real incentives for employers to
avoid or reduce harmful exposures. 28 However, they furnished workers with their exclusive remedy against employers for occupational
diseases. 29
Stephenson's third-party tort claim against various asbestos manufacturers whose products his client had used led to a modest settlement with five of the companies and a jury verdict in favor of the
sixth, the Fibreboard Paper Products Corporation. 30 This was a learning and motivating experience for the attorney. When another sick
insulation worker walked into his office later that same year, he filed a
product-liability suit in federal district court against eleven manufacturers of asbestos materials to which his new client, Clarence Borel,
had been exposed. 31
Stephenson included in his complaint claims based upon negligence, gross negligence, breach of warranty, and strict liability. Texas
had recently recognized strict tort liability as spelled out in section
402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, but its contours were as
REGULATION, Sept.-Oct. 1982, at 14, 16, 46. Brodeur amply demonstrates the baselessness of
this assertion, at least with respect to the attorneys representing plaintiffs in the landmark cases.
26. See also J. PAGE & M. O'BRIEN, supra note 11, at 57-58.
27. See Note, Compensating Victims of Occupational Disease, 93 HARV. L. REv. 916, 925
(1980); see also J. PAGE & M. O'BRIEN, supra note 11, at 65-67.
28. See Note, supra note 27, at 934.
The trial judge in a suit brought by employees against Manville for conspiracy and fraud
declared that Johns-Manville had "chosen to conceal the danger from its employees rather
than invest funds into finding a safe way of handling the product," and that the company
had undoubtedly done so because it was less expensive to pay workmen's-compensation
benefits than to provide a healthy workplace.
P. 168. The California Supreme Court eventually ruled that the state workers' compensation
statute did not bar employees from suing an employer in tort for certain kinds of extreme misconduct. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp. v. Contra Costa Superior Court, 27 Cal. 3d 465, 612 P.2d
948, 165 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1980).
29. On the exclusivity of the workers' compensation remedy, see 2A A. LARSON, THE LAW
OF WORKMEN'S CoMPENSATION § 65.11 (1987).
30. Brodeur attributes the defense verdict to plaintiff's inability to remember when or on
which jobs he had used defendant's products. P. 36.
31. One colorful detail which Brodeur provides explains the style of the case. Stephenson
had taken a dislike to the attorney who had defeated him in the prior litigation, thus he listed
Fibreboard as the first defendant, so that the case would bear its name. P. 40.
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yet ill-defined. The theory Stephenson pursued in Borel was that
defendants ought to be strictly liable for failing to warn of the dangers
posed by their products. But plaintiff's further contention was that
the duty to warn under strict liability applied only to hazards which
were known or reasonably foreseeable to defendants at the time the
products were marketed. Thus, plaintiff's burden of proof under strict
liability was no different from what he would have had to establish in a
negligence case. Stephenson did not urge that strict liability should
apply regardless of the knowability of the risk. 32 Therefore, the only
advantage furnished by strict liability would be the avoidance of most
forms of contributory negligence,33 an important factor in Borel because defendants asserted this defense as well as assumption of risk. 34
Defendants in Borel relied heavily upon the so-called "state-of-theart" defense. 35 They contended that until the results of Dr. Selikoff's
study of asbestos insulation workers became public in 1964, they
neither had reason to know nor should have known that employees
ran the risk of lung disease from prolonged exposure to their products.
Stephenson argued that defendants could and should have known of
the danger and should have informed Borel about it at a point in time
when he could have avoided the harm he suffered from his inhalation
of asbestos dust.
The jury found that all the defendants were strictly liable in tort,
all but two of the defendants had been negligent, 36 none of the defendants had been grossly negligent, and Borel had been contributorily
negligent. The district court entered judgment for plaintiff, and the
32. In Brodeur's account of the appellate argument made by Dean W. Page Keeton on behalf
of the defendants, he states that Stephenson "unleashed a wickedly effective attack upon Kee·
ton's argument by quoting several paragraphs from an article that Keeton himself had written
about product liability and failure to warn" (p. 67), which advocated the imposition of strict tort
liability despite the manufacturer's excusable ignorance of the risk. See Keeton, Products Liability - Inadequacy ofInformation, 48 TEXAS L. REv. 398, 407-08 (1970). It is difficult to understand how such a counterargument by Stephenson would have much of an effect, since his strict
liability count did not seek to impose liability regardless of defendants' knowledge of the danger.
33. See REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 402A comment n (1965) (only form of contributory fault which would be a defense to strict liability is voluntary and unreasonable encountering of known danger).
34. Defendants alleged, inter alia, that the decedent negligently failed to wear a respirator
and to ask his employers to supply blowers. Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d
1076, 1098 (5th Cir. 1973).
35. Use of the term "state-of-the-art" in this context is somewhat ambiguous, since the expression has been applied both to the degree of scientific awareness of risk and to the level of
technological feasibility with respect to eliminating or reducing risk. See Page, Generic Product
Risks: The Case Against Comment k and For Strict Liability, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 853, 877 n.104
(1983).
36. The verdict seems to have been inconsistent with respect to the two defendants that were
found not to be negligent, since the tests used by the court to determine strict liability for failure
to warn and negligent failure to warn were identical. However, the Fifth Circuit ruled that
internal inconsistencies in the general verdicts would not require a reversal. Borel v. Fibreboard
Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d at 1094.
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Fifth Circuit affirmed. 37
Brodeur's treatment of Borel differs significantly from that of Professor Richard A. Epstein, who sharply criticized the decision in a
1982 article. 38 Brodeur sees the case as exemplifying what is right
with product-liability law, while Epstein views it as symptomatic of
what is wrong. Brodeur finds the jury verdict and the holding of the
Fifth Circuit as deriving irresistibly from the evidence Stephenson
presented and his artful advocacy. Epstein concludes that the findings
of fact and ruling of law in Borel were fatally flawed.
A close scrutiny of Brodeur's account of the trial, as well as the
Fifth Circuit panel's statement of the facts of the case, suggests that
the enthusiasm of the author for what he depicts as a one-sided victory
for the plaintiff is misplaced. The evidence tending to show that
defendants could have known that exposure to asbestos insulation
products might cause asbestosis and cancer was barely sufficient at
best. Stephenson legally established that by the mid-1930s a causal
link was assumed between exposure to asbestos fibers in textile factories and asbestosis in textile workers. The only direct evidence pointing to early scientific awareness of a link between exposure to
insulation materials and asbestosis came from an expert witness who
cited reports of asbestosis in insulation workers which dated back to
1934. He did not indicate what level of exposure produced the illnesses which had been reported, and admitted on cross-examination
that very little knowledge existed prior to 1964 to show that the inhalation of asbestos by insulators was hazardous (p. 47). Stephenson
also established that the asbestos insulation companies had never done
tests to determine safe levels of exposures in workers. Defendants
presented evidence of a 1945 study which concluded that insulation
workers in United States Navy shipyards did not face an unreasonable
risk of asbestosis. However, most of the subjects of the study had been
working in shipyards for less than the period of time after which asbestosis was generally known to manifest itself. The most favorable inference which might be drawn from this evidence is that asbestos
suppliers could have had reason to suspect that insulation workers
might run a risk of serious lung disease from the levels of dust to
which their jobs exposed them.
Holding the asbestos manufacturers to the knowledge and skill of
experts, both the trial judge and the Fifth Circuit recognized that the
duty of reasonable care which defendants owed encompassed both remaining abreast of the latest scientific discoveries and testing products
37. The court found that decedent neither knowingly nor voluntarily assumed the risk, and
therefore the defense of contributory negligence in the form of unreasonable assumption of the
risk, as spelled out in Comment n to § 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, would not bar
recovery. Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d at 1096-98, 1106-08.
38. See Epstein, supra note 25.
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for potential hazards. On the basis of the knowledge which was available to defendants and their obligation to test, the appellate court upheld the jury's finding that the risk could and should have been
foreseen.
Epstein finds the Fifth Circuit's summary of the medical evidence
"one-sided and incomplete, written far more like an over-argued brief
than a judicial opinion." 39 He clearly would have drawn from it inferences favorable to the defendants. However, the issue before the court
was not what conclusions to draw from the evidence, but rather
whether there was sufficient evidence to raise a question for the jury.
The legal rule applied by the court also draws Epstein's fire. He
argues that during the period within which Borel was using defendants' products, the manufacturers could have had no inkling of the
duty to which the 1973 decision would subject them. "Before the case,
the sum and substance of the manufacturer's duty was to make sure
that its purchasers knew what its product was and perhaps to warn of
any latent dangers of which it had knowledge but the user and consumer did not." 40 In his view, therefore, Borel took the asbestos industry completely by surprise. He further contends that the obligation
to test ought to have been placed not upon suppliers but rather upon
the companies which purchased the substance for processing or other
uses by employees.
The unfairness point is dubious. The manufacturer's duty to test is
at least as old as MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. 41 Indeed, in a case
decided eleven years after Borel Manville asserted as a defense that it
had begun testing its asbestos-containing products as early as 1929.42
The first edition of the Restatement of Torts, published in 1934, spelled
out clearly (and without any "perhaps") the supplier's duty to warn
not only purchasers but anyone who the supplier might expect would
use the product.43 There was no reason for the asbestos companies to
believe that these obligations applied to the sale of products which
caused personal injury, but put no like burden upon sellers of products
that might cause diseases. 44
Epstein is correct when he points out that companies purchasing
39.
40.
41.
failure

Id. at 43.
Id.

217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916) (assembler might be liable to purchaser for negligent
to inspect finished product). On the manufacturer's duty to test, see James, Products
Liability, 34 TEXAS L. REV. 44 (1955).
42. See Hansen v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 734 F.2d 1036, 1044 (5th Cir. 1984).
43. See REsTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 388 (1934).
44. In a substantial number of jurisdictions the courts had refused to draw this distinction in
common-law suits by employees against employers. As one commentator noted, "[W]here an
occupational disease results from the negligence of the employer, thirty states have recognized
the employer's liability either expressly by allowing recovery or impliedly by denying recovery
because no negligence was shown." Banks, Employer's Liability for Occupational Diseases, 16
ROCKY MTN. L. REV. 60, 61 (1943).
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asbestos had as much access as suppliers to the information introduced
into evidence in Borel about the possible dangers of the substance. He
goes on to argue that the legal duty to test ought to have been imposed
only upon those companies, since they were best suited to conduct
research on both the harmful properties of asbestos and the levels of
exposure to which employees might safely have been subjected. One
may question whether workers' compensation statutes, imposing limited liability for occupational diseases, provided employers with meaningful incentives to test. 45 In addition, Epstein seems to assume that
the only studies which might have been done were epidemiological and
related only to tolerance levels for asbestos dust. Yet it is conceivable
that animal studies might have produced some indication of the hazard. 46 In any event, defendant's misfeasance in Borel was a failure to
convey to workers an appreciation of the extent of the danger, not a
failure to reduce asbestos dust to reasonably safe concentrations.
Both Brodeur and Epstein see Borel as pivotal. According to the
latter, the "decision completely transformed the law" affecting the liability of suppliers of asbestos. 47 As has been suggested, this characterization may be somewhat overdrawn.48 Brodeur puts his finger on the
real significance of the case which "triggered the greatest avalanche of
toxic-tort litigation in the history of American jurisprudence" (p. 73).
It demonstrated to plaintiffs' attorneys that suits against asbestos suppliers on behalf of employees of purchasers could be won and provided
a modem legal framework for pursuing product-liability claims based
upon workplace exposures. In addition, Stephenson's digging prepared the way for subsequent discoveries which would leave the
"state-of-the-art" defense in shambles.
In this latter respect, Outrageous Misconduct tends to undercut
Epstein. Epstein's analysis of the Borel opinion is solid and interesting, although one may take issue with it. But he goes beyond Borel to
deplore the wave of product-liability suits which followed Borel and
inspired the Manville bankruptcy, yet bases his criticism upon the evidence and legal rules which produced the decision in Borel. One must
read Brodeur to learn the facts which came to light in the post-Borel
cases and which shifted the focus of the litigation from the supplier's
failure to test to their failure to disclose (or suppression of) information which they actually possessed.
For example, plaintiffs' attorneys discovered that the medical director of Canadian Johns-Manville became convinced in the early
45. See note 28 supra.
46. One may criticize Borel for not requiring the plaintiff to prove that there were specific
scientific tests that defendants could have performed and that would have revealed the risk.
47. Epstein, supra note 25, at 43.
48. See also Schwartz, New Products, Old Products, Evolving Law, Retroactive Law, 58
N.Y.U. L. R.Ev. 796, 820 n.155 (1983).
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1950s that insulators and pipe coverers were in danger of developing
asbestosis (p. 99); that manufacturers of asbestos insulation materials
owned companies which did insulation contracting, and employees of
these companies had filed workers' compensation claims for asbestosis
during the 1950s (pp. 138-40); that researchers had told the Asbestos
Textile Institute (to which the asbestos suppliers belonged) in 1947
that the dust level thought to be safe provided no guarantee that workers would not develop asbestosis after prolonged exposures (p. 143);
that animal tests begun in 1943 revealed that insulation products containing only 15% asbestos could cause lung disease (pp. 148-50); and
that asbestos insulators settled product-liability suits against Manville
in 1957 and 1961 (p. 165).
There was also evidence that Manville systematically withheld
from its own employees the results of medical examinations which indicated they had contracted lung disease. The manufacturers repeatedly put pressure upon medical researchers to delay the publication of
research establishing the dangers of asbestos and to soften or obscure
their findings. One of the more ironic discoveries was a suggestion by
a Manville attorney in 1934 that a researcher tone down the conclusion of a study of asbestos workers because it would hinder a version
of the "state-of-the-art" defense that was then being asserted by the
company in tort suits by employees.49
Thus, the main thrust of the asbestos product-liability suits has
been that the companies knew of the danger and failed to warn. Moreover, beginning in 1981, plaintiffs began to assert successfully that the
manufacturers deliberately or wantonly concealed information about
the perils of asbestos and therefore should be subjected to punitive
damages. 50

III
Outrageous Misconduct and At Any Cost cast a positive light upon
the torts system in its present form. Brodeur asserts that productliability litigation is essential both as a preventive weapon against occupational diseases and as a mechanism to secure adequate compensation for victims. Mintz is somewhat ambivalent. His prescriptions in
At Any Cost for the deterrence of corporate malfeasance do not include
any specific emphasis upon tort law. However, much of the material
49. P. 114. According to the document, the attorney wrote that "it is only within a compara·
tively recent time that asbestosis has been recognized by the medical and scientific professions as
a disease," and that:
[O]ne of our principal defenses in actions against the company on the common law theory of
negligence has been that the scientific and medical knowledge has been insufficient until a
very recent period to place upon the owners of plants or factories the burden or duty of
taking special precautions against the possible onset of the disease to their employees.
P. 114.
50. See generally Special Project, supra note 4, at 690-709.
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which comprises his case study of the Dalkon Shield comes from evidence that plaintiffs' attorneys unearthed during civil suits against
Robins (p. x). In his acknowledgement he salutes trial attorneys as "a
potent check-and-balance against conscienceless corporate power" and
notes that they "achieve a measure of rough justice. They frequently
draw press attention that usefully alerts millions of people to hazards
that otherwise would not come to light ..." (p. ix).
This latter point is perhaps overdrawn. It seems difficult to believe
that the dangers of the Dalkon Shield would not have come to light in
the absence of publicity generated by the filing of product-liability
suits. 51 And the Selikoff study, rather than Borel and its progeny, first
alerted the public to the asbestos disaster.
Yet what both books under review demonstrate is the extent to
which information tending to expose corporate disregard for the
health and safety of workers and consumers surfaces through the litigation process. The incentives that the torts system provides to private attorneys seem to produce results that at the very least are
complementary (and at best superior) to what is accomplished by
other methods that society employs to oversee the conduct of mass
producers. 52 This does not mean that better, less costly, and more
cost-effective mechanisms might not be devised to accomplish this policing task. 53 What it does suggest is that in an imperfect world, reducing the effectiveness of the torts option would increase the
likelihood that malfeasance such as that described by Brodeur and
Mintz would remain hidden from public view.
The action and inaction which produced the asbestos and Dalkon
Shield disasters occurred despite the prophylactic pressure that product-liability law is supposed to exert. One critic has specifically cited
the failure of the torts process to prevent these tragedies as rather conclusive evidence of its futility.s4
Yet there are other explanations for the patterns of misconduct
committed by Robins and the asbestos industry. During the 1930s
and 1940s, the asbestos industry might not have anticipated the emer51. The congressional hearings which publicized, inter alia, the hazards of the Dalkon Shield
do not seem to have been inspired by the filing of torts suits against Robins. See IUD Hearings,
supra note 11; Hearings on Medical Device Amendments, 1973, Before the Subcomm. on Health of
the Sen. Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
52. Both Brodeur and Mintz have explored the shortcomings of the regulatory agencies that
failed to detect the misconduct that contributed to the asbestos and Dalkon Shield tragedies. See
P. BRODEUR, EXPENDABLE AMERICANS (1974); AT ANY COST at 113-27.
For a discussion of the use of criminal sanctions to deter corporate misconduct in the marketing of dangerous products, see Metzger, Corporate Criminal Liability for Defective Products: Policies, Problems, and Prospects, 73 GEO. L.J. 1 (1984).
53. See generally Sugarman, Doing Away with Tort Law, 73 CALIF. L. REv. 555 (1985).
54. See Abel, Risk as an Arena of Struggle, 83 MICH. L. REV. 772, 788 n.48 (1985).
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gence of an aggressive plaintiffs' bar55 skilled in the use of newly
adopted discovery rules56 and willing to share information gleaned
during trials. 57 And because of the nonrisky nature of the goods that
they had marketed before the Dalkon Shield came along (nonprescription cough medicines, lip balms, and flea collars, for example), Robins'
officials had no experience at all with products liability. Moreover,
during the early 1970s they seemed to have been afilicted with a kind
of "Watergate" mentality which betrayed no glimmer of concern for
the social consequences of their acts. 58
In addition, this negative assessment may give too little weight to
the lesson to be drawn by other companies from the consequences that
have befallen the asbestos industry and Robins as a result of their miscalculations. 59 Under the best of circumstances one may suppose that
the foreseeable liability costs of a failure to take adequate account (or
willful disregard) of the potential risks flowing from marketing decisions will encourage manufacturers to make reasonable efforts to prevent or minimize these risks. (On the other hand, it is also conceivable
that the lesson to be drawn will be to eliminate tangible and possibly
incriminating evidence of the corporate decisionmaking process so
that it will not fall into the hands of plaintiffs' attorneys). 60
In highlighting the pluses of the torts process, the books under
review swim against the current tide. Taking advantage of discontent
provoked by steep increases in liability insurance premiums, political
critics of tort law have launched a broad, frontal attack. 61 State legislatures have responded by enacting "reform" statutes that curtail the
rights and remedies of persons seeking compensation for injuries and
55. See Green, The Thrust of Tort Law: Part I. The Influence ofEnvironment, 64 W. VA. L.
REV. 1, 19 n.67 (1961); S. SPEISER, supra note 17, at 534-40.
56. See 4 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 111126.57-26.60 (2d ed. 1986); 8 c. WRIGHT & A.
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2002 (1970).
57. For an account of the first systematic effort by plaintiff's' attorneys to pool resources in
toxic tort cases, see Rheingold, The MER/29 Story - An Instance of Successful Mass Disaster
Litigation, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 116 (1968).
58. In an annotation to his reprimand of Robins' officials, Judge Lord refers to "[w]hat Robins' former counsel Roger Tuttle has characterized aS a Watergate-type coverup pattern of conduct exhibited by Robins with respect to the defense of the Dalkon Shield lawsuits." Lord, The
Dalkon Shield Litigation: Revised Annotated Reprimand by Chief Judge Miles W. Lord, 9 HAM·
LINE L. REV. 7, 42 n.28 (1986).
For details of Robins' most recent miscreancy, see Mintz, Judge Finds A.H. Robins in Civil
Contempt, Wash. Post, June 15, 1986, at Al, col. 1 (judge in bankruptcy proceeding held corporation in civil contempt for knowingly violating court orders and flouting both letter and spirit of
law in making improper payments and transactions).
59. See Rosenberg, supra note 21, at 1705 n.31.
60. Mintz devotes'an entire chapter to the suspicious circumstances under which thousands
of documents sought from Robins by plaintiff's' attorneys disappeared. Pp. 210-27.
61. A number of recent articles on the tort reform controversy are cited in S. REP. No. 856,
99th Cong., 2d Sess. 87 n.27 (1986). For an exchange of views, see Willard, Restore Balance to
the Tort System, A.B.A. J., July 1, 1986, at 36; Davidson, Drastic Change is Dangerous, A.B.A.
J., July 1, 1986, at 36.
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illnesses. 62 The Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation reported out a federal bill that seeks to expedite settlements
of product-related tort claims and standardize miscellaneous aspects
of the law of products liability. 63 Yet this legislation nowhere addresses the finding of a federal task force that one of the causes of the
product-liability "crisis" is the marketing of unsafe products. 64
Although the torts system may be necessary as a check upon corporate wrongdoing, in mass tort litigation the point may be reached
where virtually all the evidence of misconduct has come to light
through discovery and other mechanisms, and at the same time the
financial resources available for compensating victims are limited.
This appears to be the case with both the asbestos 65 and Dalkon Shield
tragedies. 66
Mintz, preferring a narrower focus upon the issue of corporate
malfeasance, does not address this issue. Brodeur, on the other hand,
is implacably opposed to any sort of government intervention that
would limit victims to less than their full remedy under tort law. 67
The latter position seems extreme. There may be something to be
said for holding mass tort defendants liable repeatedly for full compensatory and punitive damages when they continue to deny their cul62. See Barron, 40 Legislatures Act to Readjust Liability Rules, N.Y. Times, July 14, 1986, at
Al, col. 1. These measures include curbs on contingency fees, abolition of joint-and-several liability, and limitations on recoverable damages. For a trenchant observation on liability caps, see
NEW YORKER, June 9, 1986, at 33 (cartoon by James Stevenson). For an article expressing
reservations as to whether these laws are achieving their intended purposes, see Hilder, Insurers'
Push to Limit Civil Damage Awards Begins to Slow Down, Wall St. J., Aug. 1, 1986, at 1, col. 6.
63. S. REP. No. 856, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986). In late September the bill reached the floor
of the Senate, where it sparked a prolonged and heated debate. Because the legislative session
was scheduled to end on October 3, Senate majority leader Robert Dole removed the bill from
the agenda. See N.Y. Times, Sept. 26, 1986, at A17, col. 1; see also 132 CoNG. REc. S13,709
(Sept. 25, 1986).
64. See U.S. DEPT. OF CoMMERCE, INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON PRODUCT LIABILITY,
FINAL REPORT 1-20, 1-24 to -26 (1978). The other principal causes of the "crisis" were found to
be liability insurance ratemaking procedures which occasionally might have amounted to "panic
pricing,'' and uncertainties in the tort litigation system. Id. at 1-20, 1-21 to -24, 1-26 to -29.
65. When Manville filed for bankruptcy, the company was worth in excess of $1 billion; there
were 16,500 lawsuits pending against it and nearly 500 new suits were being initiated each
month. See Chen, supra note 2, at 30.
66. As of the end of 1984, Robins had paid out more than $300 million to Dalkon Shield
claimants. The company projected that about 20,000 of the approximately 87,000 women injured by the device would ultimately bring suit. P. 242. On December 31, 1983 the company
had total assets of slightly more than $500 million. See Kleinfield, Ongoing Problems/or Robins,
N.Y. Times, Aug. 1, 1984, at Dl, col. 3. When Robins filed for bankruptcy in 1985, there were
more than 5100 lawsuits pending against it. Since then, 310,000 women from around the world
have filed notices of possible claims under a notification plan developed by the bankruptcy court,
and another 22,000 filed claims after a court-imposed deadline. See Mintz, Dalkon Insurer Enters Case, Wash. Post, June 8, 1986, at D7, col. 1.
For recent critical accounts of the Robins' bankruptcy process, see Goldner, Final Justice for
A.H. Robins, AM. LAW., Oct. 1986, at 32; Mintz, Dalkon Shield Cases a Legal Quagmire, Wash.
Post (Business Supp.), Dec. 29, 1986, at 1, col. 1.
67. Pp. 323-54. See also Meier, The Toxic Journalist, Wall St. J., Apr. 16, 1986, at 31, col. 1.
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pability and force individual plaintiffs to bear the effort and expense of
a full trial to prove what has been established many times in the past. 68
However, a legislative solution that neither applies whitewash nor
shortchanges victims would appear to be a better approach in situations where some adjustments must be made to assure fair compensation for all victims. 69 Such a scheme should not shelve the deterrent
and punitive functions of tort law. At the very least, public recognition of blameworthiness should form a part of any statutory compensation plan and should influence its thrust.
There has been a tendency on the part of some to express alarm at
the thought that the tort system may visit excessive punishment - the
fashionable phrase is "overkill" 70 - upon corporations responsible for
mass torts. 71 Outrageous Misconduct and At Any Cost are useful reminders of who the real victims of "overkill" are.

68. On the difficulties in applying the doctrine of collateral estoppel to asbestos cases, see
Special Project, supra note 4, at 659-90. For arguments against using the doctrine offensively to
benefit asbestos victims, see Wilner, Can An Industry Be Co/laterally Estopped From Litigating
Product Liability Issues?, 4 J. PROD. LIAB. 189 (1981). See also Schwartz & Mahshigian, Offen·
sive Collateral Estoppe/: It Will Not Work in Product Liability, 31 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 583
(1986)
69. For a critical analysis of proposed asbestos compensation legislation, see Special Project,
supra note 4, at 780-806.
70. The term originated in Judge Friendly's opinion in Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell,
Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 839 (2d Cir. 1967). Plaintiff sought compensatory and punitive damages
against a drug company for negligence and fraud in the marketing of an anti-cholesterol medication that caused cataracts in users. Pointing to a number of similar claims pending against defendant and demanding similar damages for similar injuries, Judge Friendly saw as the solution
to what he designated as the "overkill" problem in mass tort punitive damage cases the subjection of plaintiff's proof to an especially strict scrutiny. In the case before him, this led him to
find that defendant would not be liable for punitive damages. The lesson of Roginsky is that if
corporate officials want to engage in outrageous misconduct and at the same time avoid liability
for punitive damages, they should be sure to inflict harm on a grand scale. For a detailed treatment of the entire MER/29 episode, see R. FINE, THE GREAT DRUG DECEPTION: THE SHOCK·
ING STORY OF MER/29 AND THE FOLKS WHO GAVE You THALIDOMIDE (1972).
71. See, e.g., Coccia & Morissey, Punitive Damages in Products Liability Cases Should Not Be
Allowed, 22 TRIAL LAW. GUIDE 46 (1978); Note, Mass Liability and Punitive Damages Overkill,
30 HAsTINGS L.J. 1797 (1979); Note, Punitive Damages in Mass-Marketed Product Litigation, 14
LoY. L.A. L. REv. 405 (1981).

